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Abstract. Gergen (1976), outlines a number of problems that
make it difficult to apply general social psychological the-
ories, or to assess their validity unequivocally. These dif-
ficulties are not unique to social psychology, however. The
application of general scientific principles has never been a
simple matter, not even in the well-established physical sci-
ences. Moreover, there are formidable difficulties in asses-
sing general theoretical propositions in every field of in-
quiry, since empirical procedures will inevitably depend on
assumptions about local field conditions, the adequacy of meas-
urement techniques, and the like. As a consequence, if re-
sults are inconsistent with theoretical expectations, there
will always be some uncertainty as to where the problem lies.
Social psychologists should not assume that their difficulties
are totally unlike those encountered in other fields of sci-
entific inquiry. The problems raised by Gergen do not, con-
sequently, rule out the possible development and application
of general social psychological theories.
Gergen’s most recent essay on the &dquo;history issue&dquo; (1976) emphasizes
a somewhat different point of view than the one that was central in his
initial effort (Gergen, 1973). His earlier piece included a substantial
discussion of certain differences between social psychology and the
&dquo;hard&dquo; sciences that made it seem unlikely (in Gergen’s view), that soc-
ial psychologists would ever find stable laws. Particular emphasis was
given to the.argument that people are often motivated to maintain their
. unpredictability and might thus alter their behavior when apprised of
some general pattern that had been detected by previous researchers (the
enlightenment effect). The prescriptive (evaluative) character of many
psychological theories was also felt to be important, since evaluative
theories are likely to induce behavioral changes in response to the &dquo;ad-
vice&dquo; that they so freely offer.2
In his more recent piece Gergen has modulated these emphases, for
he tells us that &dquo;... the precise extent to which enlightenment and
evaluative loading influence the behavior of those familiar with current
social psychology is ...an empirical issue.&dquo; Nonetheless, he contin-
ues as a forceful critic of &dquo;general theory,&dquo; although he now appears to
admit that such theories might be possible if one allowed for theoretical
propositions of a rather abstract character, such as exchange theory.
He is quick to add, however, that general theories of this sort do not,
by themselves, allow us to make concrete predictions regarding social be-
havior, for they are invariably affected by unstable contextual varia-
bles. For example, social exchange theory is &dquo;virtually without pre-
dictive value,&dquo; unless we can determine the utility of different outcomes
to the individual(s) that we are observing; and unfortunately, these util-
ities (pay-off values) may be quite unstable. Hence concrete predic-
tions will necessitate a detailed up-to-the-minute analysis
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of the values that are prevalent among the people we intend to study.
General Theory. ’. In this reading of his essay,, Gergen seems to be ar-
guing that despite the continuing - operation of a stable set of general
laws (e.g., exchange theory), social behavior may fluctuate widely, since
the situational variables (e.g., pay-off values) that enter into our the-
oretical formulation may change from time to time and from place to place.
This conclusion seems quite unobjectionable; virtually all social psychol-
ogists would agree that under changing conditions, the behaviors implied
by some unchanging general theory are likely to vary substantially. For
example, Schlenker approvingly quotes Homans (1967, p. 56): &dquo;... a
relatively few general propositions hold good of human behavior, from
which under a variety of given conditions ... a great variety of differ-
ent forms of concrete behavior follows.&dquo;- In a similar vein, Manis ’(1975)
suggested that &dquo;despite changes in the observed phenotypic relationships
between a given set of variables, diverse findings may nonetheless be
consistent with a single underlying genotypic law as it affects social
behavior in a variety of times and places.&dquo; .
I am struck by Gergen’s underlying assumption here that general the-
orgy is useless,if by itself, it is of little value in predicting complex
social behaviors. And yet, this criticism would seem to be unfair and
unrealistic; we would not, for example, consider it reasonable to ask a
meteorologist to predict tomorrow’s weather from a general forecasting
system, while denying him vital information concerning air pressure,
winds, neighboring weather patterns, etc., that would presumably serve
as important variables in the application of his model.
The relationship between any theoretical proposition and the con-
crete observations that it implies is invariably complex, since the ap-
plication of a theory normally involves several ancillary assumptions.
Thus, in criticizing traditional psychological research (as contrasted
with computer simulations), Reitman has argued (1965): &dquo;... we cannot
get a test of theory in arid of itself. We must settle for a test of the
theory taken together with all the assumptions about manipulations,
measures, and conditions that couple the theory by means of operational
definitions to the real world.&dquo;
An illuminating paper by Forsyth (1976) reminds us that this diffi-
culty has previously been recognized in other scientific fields. In The
Aim and Structure of Physical Theory, Duhem (1906) contended that a
physicist could not unambiguously test an isolated hypothesis, but was
always forced to assess an entire group of hypotheses. As a consequence,
if an experimenter obtained a set of.results that disagreed with theo-
retical expectations, there would inevitably be some uncertainty as to
just where the problem lay. Gergen’s example of exchange theory seems
quite appropriate here; an investigator might be forced to consider
whether an unexpected set of results derived from the invalidity of the
exchange proposition, from an error in estimating the effective pay-offs
in the situation, or from some other faulty assumption that had tacitly
been accepted.
In his discussion of general theory, Gergen seems to dwell briefly
(and pessimistically) on this point. He tells us, for example, that
&dquo;psychologists have found it virtually impossible to conduct’critical
tests... to link general statements unambiguously to observables.&dquo;
He then goes on to conclude that &dquo;such problems are inherent in the at-
tempt to validate any theory of broad generality&dquo; (emphasis added).
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is last quote is unfortunately somewhat ambiguous, since the words
ny theory of broad generality&dquo; may refer to (1) any social-ps chologi--
1_ theory of broad generality, or (2) any theory of broad generality,
ether in the physical or the social sciences. Duhem’s thesis would
gue for the second of these interpretations, and Duhem would doubtless
even further in contending that there are logical difficulties in de-
ving a clearcut single (&dquo;yes or no&dquo;) test for any scientific hypothe-
s, regardless of its breadth or narrowness (see Forsyth, 1976, for
re on the difficulties involved in establishing any &dquo;crucial experi-
nt&dquo;).
~ Since social behavior is always substantially influenced by contem-
raneous forces that may change from time to time (and hence must be
nitored carefully), Gergen is doubtful about the value of general the-
y. Indeed, he is concerned that such theories are predictively impo-
nt,. and are almost always applied post hoc.. , after we have observed
e behavior that we wish to explain. General theories can, however,
applied in other, more useful ways.
In his previous essay (1973), Gergen outlined the case for theory
a &dquo;sensitizer&dquo; that might help us to comprehend the social patterns
observe. This type of application constitutes only a modest gain,
wever, if indeed it must always proceed after the fact. But there are
her possibilities. General theory may serve a useful sensitizing func-
on by stimulating us to consider (predict) the future circumstances in
ich a particular pattern should emerge. Moreover, if we can control
me of the independent variables that are operative in our theoretical
stem, we may be able to apply the theory in the attainment of some
lued practical goal. 
’
For example, consider the general proposition that through inter-
ttent reinforcement it may be possible to sustain a learned behavior
ttern over a very long period of time, without expending much in the
y of incentives. This law might conceivably have some application in
classroom setting, if we can empirically determine the events that
rve as effective reinforcers for a particular group of children. The
istence of the general law may thus stimulate us to explore various
ents that may potentially have reinforcing properties because we be-
eve.(on the basis of our general theory) that when we discover an
fective reinforcer, we will be.able to apply it intermittently to
intain certain behaviors that we consider socially desirable. Note in
is example that, in accordance with Gergen’s concerns, knowledge of
a general theory would be insufficient by itself; our faith in the
neral model might, however, guide us to engage in a type of &dquo;local
gineering&dquo; research that we might not have considered in its absence
.e., assessing various events to determine their reinforcing proper-
es). The obvious hope in all this is the possibility that the general
del, in combination with an appropriately chosen (i.e., &dquo;locally ef-
ctive&dquo;) pay-off might ultimately yield a practical classroom procedure.
Gergen seems to feel that the limitations outlined in the preceding
ragraphs render general theories relatively useless, since they cannot
applied to any concrete situation without a detailed understanding of
e circumstances that prevail there. The application of general scien-
fic laws has never been a simple matter, however, not even in the well
tablished physical sciences. The technical problems that engineers
utinely encounter in the development phase of a project should remind
of the difficulties that concrete applications often entail, even in
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fields that have access to a substantial set of stable, generalized,
laws. And I do not see any basis for believing that abstract psycholog-
ical principles can (or will) be applied without a comparable expendi-
ture of time and effort. Gergen’s stress on accurate information con-
cerning the local (then and there) forces that are operative in any par-
ticular setting.thus seems quite appropriate, both in social psychology
and in other scientific fields as well.
Let us conclude this section by agreeing with Gergen that there are
indeed difficulties in deriving unambiguous tests and practical applica-
tions from any theoretical proposition. Despite similar problems, how-
ever, some fields of scientific inquiry have succeeded in developing ab-
stract, reasonably stable sets of laws that serve as a sort of intellec-
tual ideal for many social psychologists, and that sometimes appear to
have desirable practical applications. This does not guarantee a sim-
ilar success for our own field. Nonetheless, the various arguments that
Gergen has assembled in his present essay do not convince me that our
problems are unique. Hence I do not see any compelling reason why soc-
ial psychologists should give up the search for stable theoretical laws
as an unrealistic, hopeless, quest, while other investigators continue
the search (with occasional reports of success), despite the acknowledged
difficulties of the task.
Underlying processes. In an earlier piece (Manis, 1975), 1 sug-
gested that the processes that controlled social behavior might be rela-
tively stable, although they might operate on an endless variety of so-
cial contents, to yield the instabilities that we often observe as we
carry out our studies in varying times and places. Gergen (1976) con-
tends, however, that these stable underlying regularities (processes)
may be largely fictitious: &dquo;Such regularities are inevitably hypotheti-
cal constructions, artificial templates employed in making sense of an
otherwise inchoate flow of particulars. Thus, when we speak of ’pro-
cesses underlying social behavior’ we are dealing primarily with the
skill of the investigator in formulating a hypothetical structure suit-
able for encapsulating a series of selected observations.&dquo;
In contrast to Gergen’s unbelieving, critical tone, I take this
passage to present a fairly accurate description of the scientific enter-
prise in some 6fits proudest moments. For the development of a major
scientific theory quite commonly involves the construction (invention)
of some hypothetical but unseen mechanism or process that lends coher-
ence to an otherwise chaotic set of particulars. Consider, for example,
Mendel’s hypothetical construct, the hereditary factor (or gene, as we
now know it), which was not directly observable in Mendel’s time, but
constituted something of a fictional entity, an &dquo;as-if&dquo; mechanism that
was useful in explaining, predicting, and unifying a variety of observ-
ations regarding heredity; subsequent advances in genetics have, of
course, established a more palpable body of information regarding the
gene. Similarly, Darwin’s theory of natural selection may plausibly be
regarded as an invention, an imaginative hypothesis concerning an unseen
general process that seemed to offer a plausible explanation for the
myriad forms-of life that Darwin observed in his travels on the ship,
.Beagle. While the distinction between content and process is not so
clear as one might like, I do not see why social psychologists should
refrain from the attempt to develop a hypothetical framework of under-
lying processes, to &dquo;make sense&dquo; of the varied social patterns that have
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been reported. This strategy seems to have been useful in other fields
of inquiry, and may prove helpful in our field as well (if it has not
already done so).
Durables. Near the end of his essay, Gergen raises the difficult
question: &dquo;Where are the durables?&dquo; He then cites a number of &dquo;classic&dquo;
findings (e.g., the relationship between attitude and learning, the
sleeper effect, etc.) that have recently proved difficult to replicate.
How are we to interpret this?
(1) One possibility that must be considered in such cases focuses
on the validity of the original reports. In discussing some of these
cases, Greenwald (1975) implies that the initial research reports may
have reflected Type I errors in which the null hypothesis was erroneously
rejected. Moreover, he suggests that the initial studies in these fields
may have led subsequent investigators who could not obtain the estab-
lished findings to regard their own work as inadequate in some way, and
hence unworthy of journal publication. The well known editorial bias
against &dquo;negative&dquo; results may also have contributed to the seeming re-
plicability of these effects in years gone by.
(2) A second interpretation of these non-replicated effects fol-
lows the &dquo;if-then&dquo; strategy that Gergen (1976) finds so repellent. Here
the theorist might accept the initial findings as valid, along with the
more recent negative results, but would attempt to discover some modera-
tor variable (or group of variables) whose presence was critical for
demonstrating the phenomenon in question. This is, as Gergen notes, a
difficult strategy to execute convincingly, especially if the critical
changes affecting our results derive from shifting public values and
attitudes, since in such a case it might be difficult (but not necessar-
ily impossible) to determine which change(s) were truly vital.
(3) Gergen opts for a third alternative that is in some ways
rather similar to #2 (above). He believes, for example, that while it
was probably true at one time that people found it difficult to learn
and retain information that challenged their own beliefs, for reasons
that cannot be specified in any detail, historical-cultural changes have
led to the erosion of this earlier generalization (law?). This histori-
cal interpretation can also be expressed as an &dquo;if-then&dquo; proposition: If
we are concerned.about the behavior of people in the years before 1958,
then it is true that attitudes were related to learning speed (people
readily retained information that they agreed with); if we are not con-
cerned with this period, and instead focus on the years since 1958, then
we must conclude that there has in recent years been _no relationship be-
tween attitude and learning. 
-
The main difference then between alternatives #2 and #3 concerns
the level of analysis that we apply to our moderator variable. Alterna-
tive 02 is based on the hope that in many cases it may be possible to
use theoretical terms (e.g., prevalent values, social structure, coping
styles, etc.) to characterize the situations in which a given effect is
likely to be observed. Alternative #3 sets a more modest goal, and is
content to characterize the moderator in exceedingly global terms (e.g.,
contemporary social forces) without attempting to discover which factors
have been truly critical.
Alternatives #2 and #3 may be contrasted in another way. The tra-
ditional if-then strategy (#2) is based on the hope (or assumption) that
in many problems of interest, the critical moderator variables will op-
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erate with reasonable stability. For example, if a moderator variable
(M) is an important factor in determining whether attitudes (A) do or do
not affect learning (our dependent variable), then we should find a
stable M x A interaction in different studies, conducted in a variety of
social settings. However, suppose the M x A interaction is radically
affected by many other variables that prove to be quite changeable in
these differing environments. Then we would have a situation where
variable M could not be characterized as an effective moderator; that
is,the M x A interaction (moderator x attitude) would not yield a stable
result, but would be continually interacting with many other variables
in the system. We might thus have one or more higher-order interactions
(e.g.,M xA x X x Y x Z) in which the moderators of the attitude effect
operate so complexly that we would conclude, for all practical purposes,
that we could not succinctly explain why it was that the attitude-learn-
ing effect was clearly present at some times and places, but not at others.
In brief, we would have to accept alternative #3, which would assert that
an interacting complex of changing social-historical-economic-ecological-
etc. forces (unspecified) seem to be important in determining whether
attitudes do or do not affect learning. We would then presumably follow
Gergen’s suggestion and accept the fact that our research could do no
more than establish the prevalent patterns at a given time and place,
recognizing that these effects were likely to prove ephemeral.3
Now it seems reasonably clear that there are many areas of social-
psychological interest in which this sort of instability is bound to be
true. Indeed, my personal guess is that our social psychology journals
are filled with provocative research reports which often aspire to uni-
versality, but which are, alas, primarily a reflection of &dquo;local norms.&dquo;
I think that we all suspect this to be true, but hope (and sometimes be-
lieve) that our own work will be dealt with less rudely by changing his-
torical circumstances.
It occurs to me, moreover, that the instability of many results may
derive from the very ambitious and detailed level at which we have often
pitched our work. Hendrick’s contribution to this symposium (1976)
quotes Scriven (1964) to the effect that astronomy would be unlikely to
have advanced very far if astronomers had set their goal as one that in-
volved &dquo;predicting the behavior of .planets to within a micron or an
inch.&dquo; In such a case, apparently, a number of variables that are nor-
mally ignored would be of substantial importance, and the resulting
&dquo;openness&dquo; of the system would make it impossible to generate accurate
predictions. Is it conceivable that some of the difficulties we encoun-
ter in trying to locate stable behavior patterns derive from the level
. of specificity that we have bravely attempted to deal with in our at-
tempts to develop &dquo;general&dquo; theories?&dquo;
Consider, for example, the recent difficulties that have been re-
ported in attempting to relate behavior to attitudes and personality
traits (~e.g., Wicker, 1971; Mischel, 1968). Most of this work has been
carried out with what Fishbein and Ajzen (1974) termed single act crite-
ria (i.e., engaging in a particular act, such as church-going, thought
_to reflect some underlying attitude or trait). These studies have typi-
ically reported discouragingly weak and often nonsignificant relation-
ships between the questionnaire measures and the behavioral item that
was selected for study. Results of this sort may, however, be inter-
preted as a reflection of the difficulties we encounter when we attempt
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to predict behavior at a highly specific level. By contrast, Fishbein
and Ajzen’s research indicates that by broadening the focus of our in-
quiry through the use of multiple act criteria, we may be far more suc-
cessful in relating attitudes and behaviors. Note that in this case we
forego the goal of predicting which of our respondents will engage in a
particular behavior (e.g., who will donate money to a religious institu-
tion ?), and attempt instead to predict overall behavior patterns (e.g.,
which respondents will display the greatest &dquo;volume&dquo; of pro-religious
behavior when we examine a large pool of relevant actions, and treat
each act as equivalent with respect to our &dquo;behavior scale?&dquo;). This is,
of course, the same strategy that has been followed with some success in
validating tests of academic aptitude. If, in place of the multiple act
(multi-item) criteria that have been routinely used in this work, we had
attempted to validate aptitude tests against individual achievement
items (e.g., who was the third president of the United States?), we
would doubtless find it difficult to show any appreciable, stable rela-
tionship between aptitude test scores and classroom performance.
Interactions. Many social phenomena appear to be affected by in-
teractions involving two or more independent variables. This has proven
to be a difficult problem, since the relationship between an independent
variable (A) and some behavior of interest will often vary as we change
(1) the character of our respondents, (2) the setting that we choose to
study, or (3) certain unspecified cultural forces that may make our at-
tempted replications inexact &dquo;copies&dquo; of the original studies that at-
tracted our attention (e.g., our present subjects will have been exposed
to a somewhat altered set of social values in their day-to-day lives).
The difficulty here is that the impact produced by variable A may prove
quite inconstant as our &dquo;background&dquo; variables (B, C, D, etc.) assume
different values; hence it may be difficult to make any general state=
ment about the effects of A (even if A appears to have a powerful impact
in some &dquo;local&dquo; circumstances).
Cronbach (1975) presents us with many examples of this sort, rang-
ing from inconstancies in the relationship between aptitudes and class-
room performance to inconstancies in other, relatively &dquo;non-social&dquo;
fields (see below). Is it possible to-maintain a belief in general laws,
in the face of interactions-like this? Cronbach is somewhat doubtful
and comes out for a position much like Gergen’s.
Interaction effects are, of course, a clear sign that many of our
independent variables do not affect behavior in an unchanging, &dquo;general,&dquo;
fashion. However, there still remains the possibility that at some more
abstract level an unchanging general process underlies the variability
that we observe. As Cronbach observes, Darwin’s theory of natual selec-
tion provides a classic example of this, for it enables the biologist to
explain certain empirical inconstancies that may be noted, as he’varies
the time and place of his investigations. For example, while one
species (SI) may have been more prevalent than another species (S2) at
one point in time, the forces of natural selection may now have reversed
this, so that today’s investigator may find a greater prevalence of
species S2. This interaction between (1) the two populations being
dompared, Sl and S2, and (2) the year that our hypothetical studies
were conducted might nonetheless be fully consistent with Darwin’s
theory,.and hence we would not conclude that observations like this
necessarily constituted a severe challenge to the biologists’ hope that
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they might reasonably continue in their quest for broad explanatory
principles. Analogously, it is conceivable (but far from certain) that
many of the disturbing interactions that have been reported in the psy-
chological literature may ultimately prove to be more readily intelli-
gible when,viewed through the lens of some underlying abstract process.
Cronbach’s article describes interactive effects in several fields
that are quire distant from social psychology. For example, he outlines
a study in which the sleep-inducing effect produced when a standard
dose of hexobarbital was injected into a laboratory mouse was altered
substantially (sleep time was cut by more than 50%), depending upon whe-
.thertbe bedding in the animal’s cage was derived from hard or soft
wood. Softwood shavings (like red cedar) seemed to step up the activity
of certain enzymes that metabolize hexobarbital, and hence enabled the
animals to recover from the drug relatively quickly. I suspect that
this example would not lead most psychopharmocologists to reject general
theories as irrelevant, however, since it mainly testifies to the impor-
tance of metabolism, an underlying general process that satisfactorily
explained the inconstant effects produced by the hexobarbital.
The diminished effectiveness of DDT in recent years provides yet an-
other example of empirical inconstancy, but again, it is an example that
can plausibly be fitted into a general biological model. In this case
it is assumed that the selective pressures that have been operative since
the introduction of DDT may have led to a systematic change in today’s
mosquito population making them more resistant, on the average; that is,
it is assumed that survival and subsequent reproduction would be most
likely among those mosquitoes which, through random genetic variation,
were relatively hardy in the face of this man-made hazard.
Examples of this sort, in biological fields quite distant from
social psychology, have led me to wonder if perhaps the empirical incon-
stancies (interactions) that are so commonly reported in psychological
research might-be common in the more mature nonbiological sciences as
well. Hasty consultation with an elementary physics book and with a num-
ber-of colleagues in the hard sciences provided substantial support for
this conjecture. For example, the gravitational acceleration of a freely
falling body varies somewhat from one place to another, depending on
such things as latitude, elevation, and the density of the subsurface
material where we conduct our experiment. Thus, in any given locality,
the distance that an object will fall in a particular time interval may
be described by the equation d = 1/2 gt2, where g is the acceleration
due to gravity at that locale, and t is time interval in seconds. Note,
however, that if g varies somewhat from place to place (as it does),
when we plot d as a function of t2, we will obtain an array of rising
straight lines, all of which will start at the origin and then fan out,
since some lines will have a steeper slope than others (the slope will
depend on g, the rate of gravitational acceleration at that point on the
earths surface). Thus, if our object was dropped in London, g would
have a value of 981.188 cm/sec2; hence, it wou~d~accelerate more rapidly
and fall further in a given time interval than the same object dropped
in Honolulu (where the g is 978.966 cm/sec2). If we were to subject such
data to an analysis of variance in which the distance that the object
fell constituted our dependent variable, and the independent variables
were (a) the various locales that served as test sites, and (b) the
length of time that the object had fallen before we determined the dis-
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tance it had traversed, we would obtain a highly significant interaction;
i.e., the observed distances could not be explained by an additive com-
bination of our independent variables. If these empirical data repre-
sented all that we knew about falling objects, we would have to admit
that (1) while.distance was a direct function of time in every locale,
(2) the distance that was traversed in any given time interval was in-
constant and varied (for unknown reasons), depending upon the location
of our experiment. This example reminds me of Cronbach’s data, which
show that classroom performance normally goes up as aptitude is in-
creased (just as distance is directly related to time); the slope of
this aptitude-performance function varies substantially from one class-
room to another, however, leaving us in our present state of partial
puzzlement.
This line of argument does&dquo;not mean that psychology will inevitably
be able to account for its inconstancies (unexplained interactions) with
the same sort of confident general theories that we sometimes hear from
our colleagues in the hard sciences. It does, however, suggest that
interactive effects need not be interpreted as a sign that we must re-
strict ourselves to purely local phenomena and give up any hopes we may
have had for broad theoretical understanding.
Where does all this leave us? It seems to me that Gergen’s obser-
vations do not eliminate any reasonable hopes for general social-psycho-
logical theories; however, there is no guarantee that we will ultimately
succeed. His comments forcefully remind us that general theories by
themselves are likely to be insufficient when it comes to predicting or
controlling concrete social phenomena, whether in the laboratory or in
the real world. Things might be much simpler if the world was so con-
sistently structured that we could, in fact, account for all the parti-
culars that we observe by reference to just a few general propositions.
Things seem to be more complicated than this, however. While general
principles seem to be operative in many areas of inquiry, they are al-
most invariably affected by &dquo;local conditions,&dquo; which must be properly
evaluated before we can apply these abstract theories to aid our under-
standing (in our &dquo;pure&dquo; research), or to help us cope with practical
problems (in our applied efforts). In these respects, social psychology
shares many of the problems that have previously been encountered in
other fields of inquiry. 
’
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Footnotes 
1Requests for reprints should be sent to Melvin Manis, Research Center
for Group Dynamics, Institute for Social Research, University of Mich-
igan, Ann Arbor, Michigan 48109. All statements are those of the au-
thor and do not necessarily reflect the opinions or policy of the Vet-
erans Administration. Dorwin Cartwright, Howard Schuman and William
Uttal provided helpful comments in response to an earlier draft of this
paper.
2Lewin’s classic paper (1935) on Aristotelian and Galiliean modes of
thought emphasizes the fact that Aristotle’s physics included many con-
cepts that would currently be regarded as preeminently evaluative.
For example, the "highest" forms of motion were thought to be circular
and rectilinear, and would presumably occur only in the heavenly move-
ments of the stars. By contrast, modern physics is exact and mathe-
matical ; abstract functional relations have now replaced the evaluative
explanations of the past. Lewin felt that psychology was still replete
with many value concepts, although he felt that the field was then in
a state of transition. Consideration of our current state of knowledge
suggests that this transition is far from complete.
3If, as Gergen asserts, social-psychological patterns are changing,
and the changes are fairly rapid, the would-be researcher faces a
very difficult task; many complex scientific issues might remain un-
resolved because the phenomena in question had changed substantially
before any real understanding was achieved.
